Jul 14 2023 | Nº. 75

Editorial

This week underscored the broad sense that political momentum is currently on the side of the Lula administration. Late last week, Congress approved a major overhaul to the Brazilian tax code that successive presidents have attempted to enact for decades to no avail. On Tuesday, Finance Minister Fernando Haddad, Minister of Planning and Budget Simone Tebet, and Minister of Institutional Relations Alexandre Padilha met with Senator Rodrigo Pacheco to determine the law’s passage in the Senate in the weeks ahead. The bill is expected to pass, in what is expected to be a major triumph for the government. The tax reform aims to simplify Brazil’s arcane legal code. It also stoked bitter divisions within the opposition, dividing the most fervent reactionaries—who don’t want to support any policy that could redound to Lula’s benefit—and nominally more moderate conservatives who want business-friendly policies even if signed into law by a progressive president. In a tense meeting last Thursday, for example, the governor of São Paulo, who had served in Bolsonaro’s cabinet, found himself openly squabbling with the former president after he expressed support for the tax reform against Bolsonaro’s wishes.

A divided opposition gives the Lula government more room to negotiate. It means there are cracks in Bolsonaro’s base of support in the legislature that could make it easier for the executive to move its agenda forward. Indeed, Lula’s base of support in Congress looks likely to grow as parties that have nominally been in the opposition inch closer to joining his administration. The Ministry of Tourism changed hands this week and a change in Correios, the postal service, seems likely in the short term as well, the kind of bargaining that is often distasteful but central to Brazilian political dealmaking. The fact that such negotiations are underway with Lula in a position of strength is a testament to his ability to attract support from diverse ideological currents as opposed to being forced to bargain in a diminished state. 

Legislative victories and other seemingly positive developments do not take away from the major policy challenges still facing Brazil’s federal government. A new UN report found that over ten million Brazilians went hungry between 2020 and 2022 while food insecurity reached a third of the population. Lula, Haddad, and other members of the administration have talked about the tax overhaul as a means of attracting investments and creating jobs to help the neediest Brazilians in particular. Lula has frequently said that his principal aim is to make sure every Brazilian eats three meals a day. As his economic agenda becomes reality, he will argue that, little by little, the country is getting closer to delivering on that basic promise.

Highlights

• PRICE DROP. A week after Lula managed to approve a broad tax reform in Congress, there was an improvement in two important economic indicators. Inflation fell by 0.08 percent in June. This is the biggest drop recorded in a month of June in the last five years. In addition, accumulated inflation in the last 12 months stood at 3.16 percent, which is the lowest level recorded since September 2020. Lula celebrated these changes and again criticized Roberto Campos Neto, president of the Central Bank. Campos Neto took office on the recommendation of Lula's predecessor, President Jair Bolsonaro. He remained in that position after the change of government because he has autonomy during his fixed mandate. Lula has criticized Campos Neto because he maintains the basic interest rate in Brazil at a very high level, at 13.75 percent. The Right says that Campos Neto's austerity policy is responsible for the good economic figures, while the Left says the opposite: that the numbers would be even better with lower interest rates. The president of the Central Bank “has to understand that he is not the owner of Brazil,” said Lula on July 13 in Brasília.

• FOOD INSECURITY. Despite some improvements in the economy, food insecurity has grown in Brazil. Today, 21.1 million Brazilians are living in conditions that range from those suffering from malnutrition to those who need to reduce the quantity and quality of food consumed daily due to lack of resources. Between 2014 and 2016, 1.9 percent of the Brazilian population suffered from food insecurity. According to the United Nations, in its most recent survey, which covers the period from 2020 to 2022, this number rose to 9.9 percent.

• COUP D'ETAT. The various lines of investigation into the failed coup d'état attempt on January 8, 2022 continue. On June 11, Lieutenant Colonel Mauro Cid testified at the Joint Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry that deals with the coup acts. Cid was President Bolsonaro's assistant. He is the subject of eight different criminal investigations and has been in prison since May, accused of falsifying his and Bolsonaro's Covid-19 vaccination cards. In addition, the police found messages on his cell phone revealing that he had spoken of the possibility of a coup d'état in Brazil. Cid obtained a writ of habeas corpus that allowed him to remain silent for the eight hours during which he testified before the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry. The Army issued a statement saying that Cid was instructed to wear an army uniform at the hearing because he would be testifying on matters related to his role as a member of the military. Most analysts in the press said they saw this as an attempt to intimidate Commission members.

• BOLSONARO AND THE POLICE. Coup attempts are being investigated on several different fronts. On July 13, former President Jair Bolsonaro gave his fourth statement to the Federal Police. This time, the case concerns an alleged coup d'état plan involving the help of a right-wing senator named Marcos do Val. According to this senator, he and Bolsonaro had devised a plan to record compromising conversations with Alexandre de Moraes, a justice of the Federal Supreme Court and president of the Superior Electoral Court. Do Val says he talked to Bolsonaro about this plan in December 2022 in the period between the presidential elections and Lula's inauguration. The idea was to induce Moraes to say things that could put his role as a judge under suspicion and, with that, invalidate the elections that were won by Lula. In the statement, Bolsonaro told the Federal Police that he was not involved in any such plan with Senator Do Val.

• MORE INVESTIGATIONS. On another front, Supreme Court Justice Gilmar Mendes ordered the resumption of the trial charging Bolsonaro with being omissive in his presidential duties during the COVID-19 pandemic. There had been a disagreement about the appropriate forum for these investigations since the Federal court in Brasilia had filed the lawsuit against Bolsonaro. Now, with Gilmar Mendes' decision, the case will be under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General's Office, which will be responsible for investigating the complaint. In addition to Bolsonaro, former Minister of Health Eduardo Pazuello and former Minister of Communications Fabio Wajngarten may also have their conduct analyzed in the same case.

• CONSERVATIVE CHANGES. Bolsonaro has already been convicted in one of these cases involving coup acts. The Superior Electoral Court declared him ineligible to run for office for eight years, that is, until 2030, because of a July 2022 meeting he held with foreign diplomats at Palácio da Alvorada, the presidential residency, in which he attacked the Brazilian electoral system. Bolsonaro’s ineligibility will open space for the emergence of a new leaders within the Right and the extreme Right. One of the most mentioned names is that of Tarcísio de Freitas, the current governor of São Paulo and a former minister in Bolsonaro’s administration, but his support among the far-right is still uncertain. This week, Tarcísio defended the tax reform that had been proposed by the Lula government. Congress ended approving the measure with support from members of the Right, whereas Bolsonaro stood against Tarcísio on this matter. The governor of São Paulo and members of Congress from right-wing parties who voted in favor of the reform have complained of being harassed by Bolsonarists. The episode shows that there are controversies and internal disputes about who may assume leadership roles within the Right.

NEWS FROM SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS:

BLACK JULY. Throughout the month of July, the Agbara Fund, along with other organizations, is promoting a series of face-to-face and virtual events on racial issues in Brazil. Events include debates, seminars, protests, and artistic presentations designed to inform and denounce the vulnerability faced mainly by Black women – of the 33 million Brazilians in a situation of food insecurity, 54 percent are Black families, of which 33 percent are led by Black women.

THEY SHOULD STAY. The Marielle Franco Institute is one of the organizations promoting a campaign to defend the mandates of six female deputies (congressional representatives) who were recently denounced by the Ethics Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. Charges were filed for breach of parliamentary decorum, a generic accusation that, in essence, according to these organizations, is nothing more than a way to intimidate and silence a group of combative and progressive women within the National Congress.

JOURNALISM AWARD. This year, the Vladimir Herzog Institute holds its 45th annual journalism award ceremony. Since 1978, this award recognizes the best works produced by reporters and photographers dedicated to covering human rights issues in Brazil. The institute was created to carry forward the legacy of journalist Vladimir Herzog, killed under torture by the Brazilian dictatorship in 1975.

Feature Article

by Alvaro Lima

The Citizen Constitution, the Hoerig Case and the Loss of Brazilian Citizenship: The Need for the Approval of PEC 16/21

The Federal Constitution, enacted on October 5, 1988 by the National Constituent Assembly, provides for the possibility of Brazilians having dual or multiple nationality in just two cases: if recognized as a national for having been born in its territory, or as the descendant of a national. In the second case, the acquisition of dual nationality occurs when naturalization is imposed on a Brazilian residing abroad as a condition for staying in the territory of the country of residence or for exercising civil rights.

For years, the official understanding was diametrically opposed: “Brazilian nationality does not exclude the possibility of simultaneously having another nationality. The loss of Brazilian nationality will only occur in the case of a will formally manifested by the individual. In short, when becoming a foreign citizen, through the naturalization process, the Brazilian citizen does not automatically lose his Brazilian citizenship, but rather, he starts to have dual citizenship: Brazilian, by birth, and a foreigner, by naturalization”.

In practice, however, the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) that there was “no restriction regarding the multiple nationality of Brazilians” was confirmed due to the non-occurrence of cases of revocation of nationality. All this changed with the decision of the Federal Supreme Court (STF) in the judgment of the Cláudia Hoerig case, causing great insecurity in the Brazilian emigrant community.

Brazilian Cláudia Hoerig was extradited to the United States in 2018 to respond to the accusation of having murdered her own husband. Although Brazilian law prohibits the extradition of native Brazilians, the STF ruled that she had lost her Brazilian nationality when she became a naturalized American in 1999.

According to the analysis of the STF, the Brazilian who has a Green Card and chooses to acquire U.S. nationality will automatically lose his Brazilian nationality. The basis for such a decision rests on the erroneous assumption that (1) to reside, work and exercise civil rights in the United States, it is enough to have a Green Card and that, (2) the oath of allegiance during the naturalization ceremony constitutes “an act of renunciation of Brazilian nationality."

The first argument that guides the entire Supreme Court decision does not adhere to reality, since Green Card holders do not have the right to live and work in the United States without restrictions. They can be stripped of their immigration status at any time and deported. Entry into the country can be denied very easily. In addition, the Brazilian holder of a Green Card cannot exercise fundamental civil rights such as voting, holding elected office, serving as a juror and working in positions reserved only for citizens. Other restrictions include entrepreneurial possibilities, restrictions on acquiring loans and tax benefits, and problems with inheritances. Limitations still exist when they decide to apply for visas for their family members. And recently, in the reform of the Social Security system in the United States, limits were placed on access to certain benefits provided by the government for those holding a Green Card.

Finally, it is important to suggest that there is a whole body of literature showing that an individual's migratory status affects their standard of living. Citizenship protects immigrants from exploitation in the labor market, opening up multiple economic possibilities and facilitating occupational mobility – a kind of prize for naturalization. However, with the decision of the STF, many Brazilians will not obtain U.S. nationality for fear of losing their Brazilian nationality and, therefore, will have greater problems of absorption in the labor market and obstacles in occupational advances, income generation, and wealth.

Thus, it seems that the position that states that naturalization is not necessary because the Green Card guarantees “permanence in the territory of the country of residence, or for the exercise of civil rights, does not seem correct. The second reason has less argumentative weight, as it derives from the first, in addition to representing a ritualistic formal obligation.

These questions and concerns raised by the Hoerig case bring up the discussion of dual nationality and inspire the Constitutional Amendment Proposal (PEC 16/21) that amends Article 12 of the Federal Constitution to suppress the loss of Brazilian nationality due to the acquisition of another nationality. Authored by then Senator Antonio Anastasia (Social Democratic Party, PSD-Minas Gerais), the proposal was approved in the Senate in June 2021 and is under analysis by the Committee on the Constitution, Justice and Citizenship of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber on the Brazilian Congress. In the proposed text, the loss of nationality occurs only when the naturalization is canceled by a court decision due to fraud or an attack against the constitutional order and the Democratic State; or when an express request is made by the citizen to the Brazilian government, except for cases that would result in statelessness.

According to the US Census, in 2021, 562,700 Brazilian immigrants live in the United States, a much smaller number than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) estimate of 1.7 million. Still according to U.S. Census, 35.9 percent of the 562,700 Brazilians residing in the United States acquired U.S. citizenship, a decision taken without the intention of giving up Brazilian citizenship and in accordance with the guidance of the MRE. Thus, PEC 16/21 will bring legal certainty to these Brazilians and to thousands of others who, due to their family composition, professional requirements, among many other situations, are at risk of losing their Brazilian nationality.

Let us return to one of the basic foundations of the 1988 Citizen Constitution, which is the idea of broad-based citizenship and in alignment with the 1948 Universal Declaration and the Vienna Conference, aimed at recognizing and defending the dignity of the human person. Years ago, we overturned the constitutional amendment approved in 1994 that denied automatic Brazilian citizenship to the children of Brazilians born abroad – the stateless Brazilians. Now, their parents find themselves in this legal limbo. We must approve PEC 16/21 later this year so that the democratic Brazil that is being reborn also welcomes its citizens abroad.

Alvaro Lima is the Director of Research for the Boston Planning and Development Agency (BPDA) and a WBO Research Fellow. He recently served as Senior Vice President, Director of Research of the Initiative for Competitive Inner City (ICIC), a non-profit organization founded by Harvard Professor Michael Porter. A political economist by training, he is the former Chief of the Economic Department of the Ministry of Industry and Energy in Mozambique and coordinator of Regional Development Projects at the Institute for Social and Economic Research—IPARDES, in his home country Brazil. He is also the Founder of the Instituto Diáspora Brasil (IDB), a community-based, immigrant-led action research organization. Alvaro holds a Master’s in Political Economy from the New School for Social Research. Áreas de Interesse: Transnationalism, Citizenship and Human Rights, Crossborder Political Representation and Participation, and Immigrant labor market integration

Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.