Brazil’s South-South Cooperation is Back
Laura Trajber Waisbich is an international cooperation expert who currently works as a Research Fellow at the University of Oxford. She is also affiliated with three Brazil-based think tanks: the Igarapé Institute, the Articulação SUL (South—South Cooperation Research and Policy Centre) and the Cebrap (Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning). This text was originally written for issue Nº 50 of the WBO Newsletter (Washington Brazil Office), that will be published on January 20, 2023. Fill in the form at the bottom of the text to access and subscribe to the WBO weekly newsletter in English.
In his election victory speech President Lula da Silva vowed to “bring Brazil back” to the world stage. This motto has been repeated again and again by Lula, as well as by many of his recently sworn-in ministers. Central to this project are Brazil’s South-South relations. Strengthening ties with the “developing world” was at the heart of the Workers’ Party (PT) previous administrations. Lula himself was a great enthusiast of the idea. During his time in office not only did Lula task his closest foreign policy advisors with this mission, but he also personally championed it through his charismatic presidential diplomacy.
Undoubtedly, and despite the many ebbs and flows, under the PT, Brazil lived a “golden era” for South-South cooperation. The government championed regional integration, built strategic alliances with rising powers (including under the BRICS umbrella), and became a “provider” of policy and technical solutions to lesser developed countries (notably in Latin America and Africa). It also invested in boosting its own credentials as a leading voice of the developing world in multilateral fora.
Not unlike other realms of foreign policy, each one of these facets of Brazil’s “South-South agenda” contained several inconsistencies and were far from consensual. While it is healthy for foreign policy agendas to be challenged “from within” and to generate disputes over priorities, actors involved, and resources, during the PT-led period of active and assertive foreign policy (política externa ativa e altiva), however, Brazil experimented an unprecedented period of politicization, as well as partisan polarization, over Brazil’s international identity and diplomatic moves. Most of the commentaries about the South-South agenda, however, missed the point. Far from a question of ideology, improving one’s ties with the region and the developing world is a pragmatic tool to make the existing geopolitical context more conducive to one’s own development and aspirations. It makes no sense for a country like Brazil not to invest in having good ties to its neighbours, or to exclusively trade and exchange goods and services with industrialized countries and overlook markets and expertise based elsewhere. Criminalizing one’s relations with the developing world is not only short-sighted, it is a mistake. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the value of learning from and exchanging with the South on policy responses, as well as aligning with other developing countries to collectively negotiate better access to strategic inputs.
“Besides understanding its own role and identity as a major developing country in a changing world, the new government will have to address some important bottlenecks in order to make South-South cooperation a useful tool as Brazil returns to the global stage”
From global health to global trade, having good relations with the “wealthy countries” is necessary but far from enough. Looking forward, Lula and his foreign policy makers are poised to resume this vast array of South-South cooperation efforts, as a soft power using strategic tools for Brazil. Take for instance the environmental agenda. Here, South-South relations are an essential component of the much-needed renewed Brazilian activism on this pressing global challenge. On the one hand, there is no solution to the daunting challenge of reverting deforestation and environmental crime in the Amazon without our neighbours. On the other hand, from climate to biodiversity negotiations, there is global room and appetite for re-making Brazil as one of the leading Southern voices, reinforcing the country’s traditional stance of bridging environmental protection and socio-economic development agendas. One can also expect the new government to resume Brazil’s diplomatic activism in other multilateral arenas, including peace and security, global health, and inclusive development.
While Brazil’s voice is important (and still very much needed), global politics are very different from what they were when the Workers’ Party was removed from power in 2016. Not only has the world became more volatile, but also “the South” is increasingly a diverse entity. Larger developing countries do not always represent (and worst still, might even enter into conflict with) the positions of smaller countries. Climate change is again a good example. Small-island states expect large emitters from the South, like China, India, and Brazil, to do more than point their fingers to historic emitters in the North and accept their own share of common but differentiated responsibilities. The same goes for other public goods, including global development goals.
Besides understanding its own role and identity as a major developing country in a changing world, the new government will have to address some important bottlenecks in order to make South-South cooperation a useful tool as Brazil returns to the global stage. First, Lula has to include it in the budget and governmental structures. This means having specialized human resources for international cooperation within governmental ministries and enacting legal and institutional reforms, including approving a long-standing international development cooperation law that can help Brazil to better operationalize and use its development cooperation initiatives as a foreign-policy instrument. It also means creating better interfaces with policy, science, and society on foreign-policy-related issues. Here, the new government must improve diplomatic planning structures within the Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamaraty) and formalized communication channels among the ministry, the presidency, and different actors in civil society. Rather than old debates, these unfinished reforms can help the new government to make its renewed South-South rhetoric a real tool in the reconstruction of Brazil’s foreign policy.
The text was originally written for issue Nº 49 of the WBO Newsletter (Washington Brazil Office), published on January 13, 2023. Subscribe to the WBO weekly newsletter in English.
