The Haitian crisis and the international stalemate
João Fernando Finazzi has a PhD in International Relations from the San Tiago Dantas Program (Unesp, Unicamp, PUC-SP). He is a researcher at the National Institute of Science and Technology for Studies on the United States (INCT-INEU) and at the Study Group on International Conflicts (GECI/PUC-SP). This text was originally written for issue 55 of the WBO Newsletter, published on February 24, 2023. Fill in the form at the bottom of the text to access and subscribe to the WBO weekly newsletter in English.
“Brazil is back on the global stage.” That is the main message president Lula carried during his visits to United States, Uruguay, and Argentina. Fighting climate change and world hunger, defending democracy, and ending the war in Ukraine and other locations are probably the main challenges that lie ahead. But in this contemporary search for a larger international presence of Brazil, the Haitian crisis might also receive appropriate consideration.
With surprising speed, we watch a profound deterioration of the humanitarian, political, and security situation in Haiti. Hunger and armed violence by urban gangs disputing territories are intensifying, especially in the capital, Port-au-Prince, where according to UN figures they control around 60 percent of the city. The country’s political system finds itself in wreckage with not a single elected senior official in office.
The Haitian crisis has the potential to become an important theme in Brazil-US relations regarding hemispheric security and humanitarian affairs. However, the prospect of an international military intervention is finding strong resistances in Haiti and internationally.
Since October, Haitian prime-minister de facto Ariel Henry is waiting for a foreign intervention. Henry formally requested it to the international community and reinforced the invitation during the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) summit in Argentina in January. But the position of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Western Hemisphere countries is not uniform.
“For Brazil, the military engagement in Haiti is recognized by some leaders as a mistake. It empowered and legitimized several senior military officers who later began to act more and more in politics, and even supported and constituted the far-right government of President Jair Bolsonaro”
Still, in October Mexico and the United States submitted to the Council a resolution regarding the creation of an international force to intervene in Haiti under chapter VII of the UN Charter, but despite support from France and United Kingdom, Russia and China were resistant, and the resolution was tabled. But even if the political barrier is crossed and a position in favor of a multilateral intervention gained support, operational problems remain. The United States is currently not willing to send many troops or to lead the military aspect of the engagement, and Canada, another strong candidate to conduct the mission, already sent signs that it prefers maintaining sanctions rather than deploying the military.
That month, Brazilians Celso Amorim and Aloizio Mercadante along with political figures from other Latin American countries signed an emphatic statement of the Grupo de Puebla criticizing the intervention proposal. In the text, Amorim who is the now Lula’s foreign affairs adviser and Mercadante, the new president of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) recognized the role that frequent foreign interferences in Haiti played in the recurrence of its crisis and considered it urgent to seek alternative forms of engagement.
The last foreign military intervention that occurred in Haiti was in 2004, when the United States, France, Canada, and Chile sent troops in a UN Security Council authorized action to curb the growth of armed violence after the coup that overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Then the soldiers of the coalition were substituted by the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a mission militarily led by Brazil, as force commander and largest troop contributor.
The legacy of the mission, which lasted until 2017, are at least problematic and considering them helps us understand the frequent manifestations of resistance of Haitian and international civil society organizations. MINUSTAH was unable to build the foundations to avoid the recurrence of political and social instability, conflicts between armed groups, and the humanitarian crisis. The Haitian National Police, trained with the help of the international community, notably the United States since the mid-1990s, is still not able to contain the activities of these armed groups. There are also many reports about cases of violence and violations of human rights committed by UN peacekeepers, such as excessive use of force, summary executions, and sexual crimes. The UN Blue Helmets are also blamed for causing the cholera epidemic that ravages the country.
In Brazil, the military engagement in Haiti is recognized by some leaders as a mistake. It empowered and legitimized several senior military officers who later began to be increasingly involved in politics, and even supported the far-right government of President Jair Bolsonaro. Furthermore, the same violent and rights-violating engagement tactics used in poor communities of Port-au-Prince were also put into practice in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, raising criticism from social movements of MINUSTAH.
The crisis in Haiti affects Brazil’s domestic policy in a less significant way that that of the United States, especially if we consider migration policies, the fight against transnational organized crime, and the electoral dynamics in Florida. However, it is necessary to consider the position of Brazil’s return to regional action in Latin America and the Caribbean, highlighted by Lula during his speech at CELAC. Even if Brazil seems unwilling to act as the military leader of an international intervention in Haiti, the country will not be absent from outlining alternative forms of action and contributions. In the Buenos Aires Declaration of January 24, 2023 CELAC countries, including Brazil, encouraged their members to consider the possibility of engaging in an intervention in Haiti. This position, although collective, may also indicate a slight change in the Lula government’s position if compared with the tone and content of the letter from the Puebla Group mentioned above. But it expresses an important continuation of the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ diplomacy since 2022.
