The In-Betweener: Why Brazil Could be a Bridge to Both Sides of a Divided World
Anthony W. Pereira is the Director of the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University and a Visiting Professor in the School of Global Affairs at King’s College London. This article was originally written for Interesse Nacional, where it was published on May 18, 2023. It was then offered by the author for reproduction in issue 81 of the WBO Weekly Bulletin, published on August 25, 2023. For Subscribe and receive the WBO newsletter for free, just enter your email in the form at the bottom of the article.
The post-Cold War unipolar moment, celebrated with unrestrained triumphalism by some commentators, is long over, buried by the financial crisis of 2008-9 and the untriumphal US withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 2011 and Afghanistan in 2021, after years of costly and unsuccessful war. The world is now increasingly bipolar. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has accelerated this trend.
On one hand the United States, the hegemon of the post-World War II order and the architect of its major multilateral institutions, argues for the preservation of the status quo, a supposedly “rules based” system in which the interests of the USA are dominant, especially in the military sphere. On the other hand China, emerging from its “century of humiliation” to become the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods and an increasingly important source of foreign direct investment and development finance, argues for the democratizing reform of global governance (Council on Foreign Relations 2022). The USA and China “are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order” (US National Security Strategy 2022: 1).
Descriptions of this divided world vary. Calling it “the West” versus “the rest” is not really accurate, as states such as Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea find common cause with the United States in wanting to check Chinese power in Asia. As the vote about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the United Nations General Assembly on 12 October 2022 revealed, in every region of the world, some states gravitate towards the Russian-Chinese axis, while others are more firmly in the US-European camp.[1]
Some states are in between (Spektor 2023). India, Turkey, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia come to mind. Brazil is one of them. There are many reasons why the architects of Brazil’s foreign policy should see themselves as uniquely capable of managing good relations with both China and the United States, despite the widening rift between these two major powers.
Brazil’s affinities with China date back to the days of the Portuguese seaborne empire, when Brazil was a way station for Portuguese ships going to and returning from Asia. In the modern era, both states share a sense that they are destined for greater influence in world affairs. The managers of the Brazilian state, convinced that unipolarity is contrary to Brazilian interests, approve of China’s challenge to US hegemony. They are impressed by China’s rapid economic development and hope to move Brazil beyond its role as a provider of commodities to the Chinese economy, hoping to benefit from Chinese investment in clean energy and infrastructure in Brazil and perhaps the sharing of some forms of technology.
“Being skeptical and autonomous of the United States does not make the managers of Brazilian statecraft unapologetic cheerleaders for Chinese aspirations to global supremacy”
Brazil also has strong ties to the USA. Both countries fought wars of independence against a European colonial power. Both today are multiracial democracies with similar presidential political systems. The estimate of Brazilians living in the United States is close to 2 million people, and the cultures of the two countries influence each other. Politically, the managers of Brazil’s foreign policy want the USA to take Brazil seriously as a globally influential state and not just another part of Latin America.
Those same managers can see the confusion and contradictions of US policy towards China. US capital and US diplomacy played decisive roles in the rise of China as a major power. US demand for its exports continues to sustain the Chinese manufacturing sector. In 2022 US imports from China were worth $690.6 billion, a record, contributing to the overall US trade deficit of $945 billion in the same year (China Briefing 2023). US posturing about the need to prevent Chinese dominance in high-tech sectors sits uneasily with the tremendous degree of integration of the two nation’s economies.
Brazil’s foreign policy managers can see the difference between Brazilian and US interests when it comes to China (Barbosa 2023). For example, unlike the United States, Brazil does not have a trade deficit with China, nor does Chinese technological innovation threaten Brazil. Furthermore, the US insistence that it opposes Chinese influence because China is non-democratic lacks consistency. As the contemporary Middle East shows, the US is willing to support non-democratic regimes when they suit US interests.
Being skeptical and autonomous of the United States does not make the managers of Brazilian statecraft unapologetic cheerleaders for Chinese aspirations to global supremacy. They do not want to trade US for Chinese unilateralism. Chinese “wolf warrior” diplomacy runs counter to the Brazilian preference for discreet multipolar negotiations within the framework of clear international rules. The objections of smaller states in Asia to the projection of Chinese power in the region resonates with Brazil because it echoes Brazilian objections to US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, such as when Brazil expressed concern about US military bases in Colombia during Lula’s previous presidency in the 2000s.
There are many challenges for the global order in the 21st century. Climate change, pandemics, and the increasingly nationalist and protectionist direction of trade and investment are three of the most serious. Another is the tension between the two most powerful states in the global order, and the importance of avoiding a war between them (Allison 2017; Kissinger 2012). Such a war would probably make the current war in Ukraine look small in comparison. China and the United States should be able to manage their differences and continue to cooperate, despite declining levels of trust and high-level interaction. (The last visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to the United States took place in 2017, while the last US President to visit China was President Trump in the same year.) But they may need the help of other states in doing so. Brazil could perhaps play a role in addressing this challenge, because it is uniquely suited to the role of an in-betweener. While it has played this role maladroitly – see Lula’s recent comments about the Ukraine war, for example (Buarque 2023) – that does not mean it could not play it more skilfully in the future.
References
Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Mariner Books, 2017).
Rubens Barbosa, “A Nova Ordem Internacional e o Brasil” in Interesse Nacional at https://interessenacional.com.br/posts-irice/a-nova-ordem-interncional-e-o-brasil/ accessed on 30 April 2023.
Daniel Buarque, “Brazil `Voltou’ Para Cima de Muro, Mas Corre Risco de Ser Visto Como Problema por Todos os Lados da Tensão Global” Interesse Nacional at https://interessenacional.com.br/edicoes-posts/daniel-buarque-brasil-voltou-para-cima-do-muro-mas-corre-risco-de-ser-visto-como-problema-por-todos-os-lados-da-tensao-global/ accessed on 30 April 2023.
China Briefing, US-China Trade in Goods Hits New Record in 2022 – What Does it Mean for Bilateral Ties? 15 February 2023 at https://www.china-briefing.com/news/us-china-trade-in-goods-hits-new-record-in-2022-what-does-it-mean-for-bilateral-ties/ accessed on 1 May 2023.
Council on Foreign Relations, China’s Approach to Global Governance (New York: CFR, 2022) at https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/ accessed on 30 April 2023.
Henry Kissinger, On China (London: Penguin Books, 2012).
Matias Spektor, “In Defense of the Fence Sitters: What the West Gets Wrong About Hedging” in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2023, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/global-south-defense-fence-sitters accessed on 30 April 2023.
The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington DC: October 2022)
[1] Resolution ES 11/4 condemned the Russian referenda in eastern Ukraine and demanded Russia’s withdrawal from the country. Voting against were Russia, Syria, Nicaragua, North Korea, and Belarus. Abstaining were 35 states, including Bolivia, China, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, South Africa, Thailand, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Ten states, including Venezuela, were absent, while 143 states, including Brazil, voted in favour.
