Why Doesn't the Brazilian Far-right Incorporate Trump's Immigration Policy into Its Platforms?
By João Carlos Jarochinski Silva*
Almost a month after Donald Trump's inauguration for his second term as US president, it is clear that the issue of immigration has been central to his agenda, especially with regard to entry control, the deportation of people in an irregular situation, and the suspension of funding for humanitarian actions and organizations linked to the UN system that work on human mobility. These measures, widely highlighted by the government's communications team, demonstrate Trump's ability to meet the desires of a significant portion of his electoral base, ensuring their loyalty and reinforcing his political agenda.
In the United States, the far-right, represented by the Trump administration, plays a leading role and influences similar political movements in other countries, such as Brazil. In light of this scenario, this article seeks to explore some hypotheses to understand why the Brazilian far-right has not emphasized, in its action platforms, the reproduction of the immigration policies currently adopted in the United States. This exercise allows us to assess the real weight of the immigration issue in Brazil, especially in the week in which the seven-year anniversary of Operation Acolhida (Welcome) is celebrated and the newspaper Folha de São Paulo published, in its Trends/Debates section, the article Immigration is good for Brazil, written by Horacio Lafer Piva, Pedro Passos and Pedro Wongtschowski, all representatives of the Brazilian business community. These two events serve as elements that we will explore in an attempt to answer the question posed in the title. Operation Acolhida – launched in 2018, during the Temer administration – was developed based on the particularities of Roraima, a state characterized by low effectiveness in the provision of public services, a predominance of federal employees linked to the Defense and Security apparatus, and for being the only structural connection point between Brazil and Venezuela through the twin cities of Pacaraima and Santa Elena de Uairén.
The Venezuelan migratory flow began to intensify in 2015 with a constant growth in net inflows between 2015 and 2019. This mobility, driven by the deep political, economic, and social crisis that has marked Venezuela since the death of Hugo Chávez, has transformed Brazil into both a destination and a transit territory for these people. The impact of this movement has generated social tensions in the state's municipalities, especially in Pacaraima and Boa Vista, which have seen a significant increase in their populations and in the demand for essential services, such as health and education. However, the most visible aspect of this phenomenon has been the growing presence of people living on the streets of these cities.
As was common during the Temer administration, the Armed Forces played a central role in formulating the Brazilian response to the challenges generated by this increase in mobility in the region. Military action on migration and humanitarian issues was already part of the Armed Forces' scope of interests, as evidenced by Exercise AmazonLog 17. Acolhida ended up being politically instrumentalized, bringing the Venezuelan crisis to the center of the national debate. The prevailing discourse linked the need to prevent Brazil from following the same path as Venezuela, a rhetoric that, although unfounded in the comparison between the development and institutions of both countries, gave political and operational prominence to the Armed Forces.
In this context, our first hypothesis arises: the fact that the humanitarian response was structured under military leadership and focused on providing priority care to a population originating from a country governed by a left-wing regime allowed Operation Acolhida to continue during the Bolsonaro administration. This prevented segments of the far right from criticizing the initiative, especially considering that the first commander of the operation, General Eduardo Pazuello, later became a member of Congress linked to this political sector. His actions reinforce the defense of Operation Acolhida and its relevance in Brazilian migration policy. Even under the Lula government, the maintenance of Acolhida did not become the target of criticism from the opposition.
Acolhida is also related to the article published in Folha de São Paulo, since one of its pillars is dispersing people, many of whom are directed to other regions of Brazil through job offers. The article, written by representatives of the business sector, highlights the positive aspects of migration in the country, but its emphasis is mainly on the availability of labor and entrepreneurship as central factors in the argument. In this context, the dispersing policy reflects a perception already present in some business segments: the aging process of the Brazilian population and, in a scenario of low unemployment, the increasing difficulty in filling lower-paid job vacancies or in sectors that the local population, especially in areas such as agribusiness and construction, tend to avoid.
The demand from the business sector, especially in areas relevant to Brazil's GDP, prevents the far right from adopting a discourse openly against immigration, based on the defense of national identity or the supposed threat that migrants represent to the country. To justify this lack of criticism without contradicting their ideological platforms, they resort to adaptive rhetoric, such as valuing miscegenation, also present in the Folha de São Paulo article. However, this narrative ignores the recurring episodes of racism and xenophobia that are common in Brazilian society, including those experienced by migrants themselves. It is clear that the interest in the migration agenda is essentially instrumental, adapted to the economic and political context. This is reflected in the lack of significant questions within these sectors regarding the treatment given to Brazilians deported by the United States or the suspension of resources made by the Trump administration, which directly impact the services provided to Venezuelans under Operation Acolhida.
It is essential to move forward in the construction of a national migration policy that, in fact, implements the principles established in the Migration Law and, above all, ensures adequate resources for the development of these actions. The political scenario for 2026 is uncertain, and Congress, despite its differences and contradictions, remains a space where the debate on migration can go beyond the mere electoral use of the agenda, often instrumentalized by exclusionary nationalism.
In this context, it is essential that the executive assume a more active role, setting the agenda for the issue and ensuring the implementation of the decisions taken at the Second National Conference on Migration, Refuge and Statelessness (Comigrar-2024). This would prevent this opportunity from being wasted and ensure that deliberations would continue to be, in many cases, the same ones discussed ten years ago, at the First Comigrar (2014). Furthermore, government inaction at this time could open space for the far right, in a different context and with different interests, to assume the leading role in defining migration policies, representing serious risks to the protection and access to rights of migrants in Brazil.
*João Carlos Jarochinski Silva, who has a PhD in Social Sciences and post-doctorate from the Center for Population Studies (Nepo/Unicamp), is Professor of the International Relations course and the master’s course in Society and Borders at the Federal University of Roraima. His research topics relate to human mobility since 2007.
This article was written for issue 155 of the WBO newsletter, dated February 21, 2025. To subscribe and receive free weekly news and analysis like this, simply enter your email in the field provided.
