Bolsonaro May Lose, But His Impact is Here to Stay

By Rafael Ioris

Sunday, October 2nd was a day of great expectation in Brazil. Based on most electoral polls, it seemed that former president Lula da Silva would gain more than 50 percent of votes and thus end the presidential election in the first round. That is what most people expected. Although there were reports of long lines in many precincts, the day unfolded normally. But when the initial counts stated coming in, most people were astounded by the fact that Bolsonaro, the extreme right-wing president, was ahead of Lula by a good margin.

The initial surprise quickly turned into apprehension, though many voices tried to assuage Lula’s supporters that most of the initial votes were coming from areas in the country where the incumbent candidate was expected to do well. Still, some started having a déjà vu feeling of what happened in 2016 when Trump stunned everyone by a most unexpected victory.

In the end Lula came in ahead of Bolsonaro but by a margin much smaller than expected: 5 percent rather than the 10 percent predicted by most polls. So, what happened in Brazil? And what can we expect from the second round taking place on October 30th, which is likely to determine the fate of Latin America’s largest country for the next several years, with echoes throughout the region, and even beyond?

First of all, it is becoming a recurrent fact that pollsters are having a hard time predicting the electoral behavior of rightwing candidates in many parts of the world, as demonstrated not only in Brazil this month and in the United States in 2016, but also in the United Kingdom during the Brexit vote and more recently in France. But if this seems to be a general trend, perhaps related to the fact that many feel shy about declaring a vote they feel pollsters will likely see as politically incorrect or even reproachable, in Brazil there are additional complications that need to be understood.

For one, Bolsonaro did not provide the funds for the national census, which was supposed to have taken place in 2020. As a result, there is no precise way for polling agencies to map out the actual composition of the country’s population, particularly in terms of a dramatic shift in religious affiliation known to have taken place in the last 10 year. Secondly, and this seems to be particularly acute in the Brazilian case, at times under instructions of the conservative religious leaders, many voters refuse to declare a vote for their extremist candidate, thus diminishing the accuracy of polls that had been correctly designed.

Although Lula may still be the favorite to win the election, the latest polls indicate that his lead seems to be very tight. In fact, electoral results throughout the county in the first round of the elections indicate that the rightwing social shift that Bolsonaro unleashed in the last few years, which we could call Bolsonarismo, is stronger than expected. Moreover, there is a very real possibility that he may even manage to get reelected to further his authoritarian agenda paradoxically in a country that until not too long ago seemed to be on verge of becoming a consolidated democracy.

To be sure, Bolsonaro obtained almost the same number of votes he ended up having when he won four years ago. This is certainly a surprising feat for a president that mismanaged the pandemic to the point of Brazil being the second most affected nation by Covid-19, in terms of lives lost. In so doing, he managed to halt the momentum that Lula had going into the first round and proved that his fake news network on social media (WhatsApp, Instagram and YouTube), responsible for his victory in 2018, is still very effective, something that will certainly provide him with strength going into the second round.

All in all, Bolsonarismo has indeed become a defining feature of Brazilian politics for the time being. Many of his closest associates – like Damares Alves, Minister of the Family, and a clear extremist in socio-cultural matters, and Eduardo Pazzuelo, a general and former Minister of Health during the Covid debacle – were elected to Congress with huge margins, proving the broader appeal of the president’s agenda and aggressive rhetoric.

Likewise, though some important victories on the progressive front occurred (e.g. the election of indigenous leader Sonia Guajajara and trans women Erika Hilton and Duda Salabert, all elected to Congress), central themes of Lula’s platform, such as gender equality and environmental protection, are not central issues for close to half of Brazilians as they are to the other half. Moreover, if Bolsonaro was the alleged outsider (hence holding the appeal of being a novelty) four years ago, this time around he ran on record of economic devastation for poor Brazilians, disdain for democratic institutions, militarization of public administrative positions, and, above all, a massive public health crisis. 

But rather than voting based on this evidence though, many Brazilians are voting based on cultural wedge issues efficiently manipulated, once again, by Bolsonaro’s camp. In fact, in many parts of the country, Bolsonaro’s extreme conservative views on social issues, aggressive rhetoric, and authoritarian propositions (e.g. closing of the Supreme Court) are more than ever understood as much-needed solutions for complex problems many Brazilian face daily.

And even if Lula ends up winning, the deep divide that now defines Brazil will add to the many challenges he will face in government. So, Bolsonaro may lose, but his impact is here to stay.