Bolsonaro Is One Step Closer to a Power Grab
By Andre Pagliarini
The stark rebuke to the reactionary government of Jair Bolsonaro, predicted by the polls and desired by millions, didn’t come to pass. Brazil is on edge.
It wasn’t all bad. In Sunday’s presidential election, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the center-left former union leader who governed Brazil ably from 2003 to 2011, took roughly 48 percent of the vote, a healthy performance within the final polls’ margin of error. But Mr. Bolsonaro exceeded his presumed ceiling, taking 43 percent — far above previous predictions — and setting up what will most likely be a closer than expected runoff on Oct. 30. What’s more, several of Mr. Bolsonaro’s former cabinet ministers and allies across the country rode his coattails to success in local elections.
The results showed beyond any doubt that Mr. Bolsonaro is no accident of history. It might have been possible to dismiss his surprising election four years ago, when he rose to power on a wave of widespread anti-left sentiment, as a fluke. No longer. Underlying his vague appeals to “God, fatherland and family” is a bedrock of support, spread across the country and encompassing a wide cross-section of society. Irrespective of the result at the end of the month, the spirits Mr. Bolsonaro animated and the politics he cultivated are here to stay.
Mr. Bolsonaro’s beginnings in Brazilian politics were ignominious. An army captain, he first came to national attention in the mid- 1980s as the armed forces were beginning a tactical retreat from political life after two decades of military rule. A leading newsmagazine revealed that Mr. Bolsonaro, resentful about poor remuneration, was planning to bomb a barracks in Rio de Janeiro. The goal, he told the reporter with remarkable directness, was to embarrass the unpopular army minister.
After a flurry of publicity and an internal investigation in which Mr. Bolsonaro appeared to threaten the journalist for testifying against him, the incident was largely forgotten. But the macho bluster was typical of Mr. Bolsonaro, a lackluster soldier whose outsize political ambitions often rubbed senior military figures the wrong way. Even so, his military background proved electorally useful. In 1988, after the restoration of Brazilian democracy, he began a political career as a representative of the interests and perspectives of the military Everyman.
Over time, his appeals assumed a more general right-wing tenor, embracing the conservative thrust if not the theology of evangelical Christianity. Mr. Bolsonaro’s politics — a medley of bigotry, authoritarianism, religious moralism, neoliberalism and freewheeling conspiracy theorization — were largely sidelined in the wake of military rule. But 13 years of progressive Workers’ Party governments gave rise to discontent on the right. To figures there, the left’s repeated electoral victories smacked of foul play and discredited the very notion of democracy itself. At the head of this charge, possessed of inimitable ideological bombast, was Mr. Bolsonaro. In Latin America’s biggest democracy, he now speaks for tens of millions.
Sunday underscored this sorry state of affairs. Mr. Bolsonaro’s endorsed candidates overperformed everywhere, claiming major victories against candidates backed by Mr. da Silva in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Indeed, the first round of voting suggests not only that the political project that prevailed in 2018 — in a word, “Bolsonarismo” — is alive and well but also that it has room to
grow. Considering Mr. Bolsonaro’s disastrous handling of Covid-19, his consistent threats to Brazilian democracy and the rash of corruption scandals surrounding him and his family, this is a grim prospect.
Yet not an inexplicable one. Though there’s a lot we don’t know — the census, delayed by the pandemic and institutional sabotage, is over a decade old — some things are clear. While Mr. Bolsonaro retained his overwhelming advantage in the western and northwestern parts of the country, the most striking aspect of the election was how cleanly it fell along established lines of regional support. In the southeast, a traditional bastion of conservative politics, Mr. Bolsonaro prospered. In the northeast, a redoubt for the Workers’ Party, Mr. da Silva excelled. Mr. Bolsonaro’s success has been to retain and extend the traditional conservative base of support, enthusing it with his bitter denunciations of progressives, the justice system, journalists and international institutions.
Yet for all of Mr. Bolsonaro’s show of strength, the most likely outcome remains a victory for Mr. da Silva. After all, no runner-up in the first round of voting has ever won the second. The candidates who finished third and fourth — the center-right Simone Tebet and the center-left Ciro Gomes — will probably support Mr. da Silva, too. The former president’s relish for campaigning, evident in an upbeat message he wrote on Twitter once the results were clear, is another advantage. Four weeks in campaign mode should suit him well.
But extending the campaign is a dangerous proposition. Mr. Bolsonaro’s supporters have already engaged in numerous acts of violence against Mr. da Silva’s supporters. It would not be surprising if “Bolsonarismo,” a movement rooted in violent rhetoric, claims more lives before Oct. 30. Meanwhile, President Bolsonaro, gifted time and greater credibility by his surprising success, can continue plotting against Brazilian democracy.
Several hurdles remain in the way of a power grab by Mr. Bolsonaro. But he has just cleared a major one.
Andre Pagliarini (@apagliar) is an assistant professor of history at Hampden-Sydney College, a fellow at the Washington Brazil Office and a columnist at The Brazilian Report.
This article was also published at the New York Times on October 5.
