Three Possible Scenarios for the Brazilian Presidential Electoral Outcome - 09/30/22

Pablo Holmes 

As I write, the elections in Brazil are approaching in a strange atmosphere. Everybody expects that something bad may happen at any time either on October 2, election day, or soon thereafter. Strangely, however, there is also a feeling of relief in conversations among colleagues at the university, and among students, journalists, and political analysts. 

Despite some cases of violence, almost all of them involving Bolsonaro’s supporters attacking political opponents, the campaign has unfolded relatively quiet so far. Opinion polls have not changed much since August. Furthermore, in this last week before election day, all polls show a small increase in Lula’s leadership, who now has 47% against 32% of Bolsonaro, according to a reliable polls aggregator. After the 4-year term of a president who has trashed the presidential office from day one, everything suggests that his chances of reelection are extremely low. 

Notwithstanding, democracy is also a project in uncertainties. Indeed, one can only call an election democratic if its results are only known after the counting of votes. If the results of an election are known in advance with certainty, then it is very likely that we are witnessing an authoritarian regime with staged elections. 

With that in mind, I want to suggest the three most likely scenarios for what might happen on October 2nd, depending on the actual results that may emerge from the ballots. 

The most likely scenario still seems to be a second round on October 30th between Lula and Jair Bolsonaro. In this case, we would still have four weeks of electoral campaigning, which might become brutal, but also might turn out to be just a continuation of what we have seen in the last two months. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that Bolsonaro could overcome his record high rates of rejection. According to the polls, over 50 percent of Brazilians disapprove of his job as a president and more than that say they would not vote for him in any case. Lula’s numbers are simply much better.

Another less likely scenario would be the presidential election ending on October 2nd, with Lula receiving more than 50% of the votes, thus winning in the first round.

In both scenarios, Bolsonaro is expected to contest the electoral outcome, claiming the electoral system is rigged by leftist judges, who have stolen the elections from him using a fraudulent electronic voting system (the same system through which he was elected president, and congressman five times). Emulating Donald Trump, he will likely encourage his supporters to take to the streets. And some violence may follow. From what we know now, there is however very little enthusiasm for this within political institutions for an organized challenge by Bolsonaro to the electoral results. He has no backing in the press, or among the most important parties in Congress. Nor does this possibility have much traction among intellectuals and journalists. Most importantly, Bolsonaro has no relevant support from big business. In August, the most important business associations in the country (with exception of those related to the agrobusiness) signed a petition in defense of the voting system and supporting democratic stability. Just like Trump, it seems that Bolsonaro would have to rely exclusively on his more hard-core supporters to make a move against the Superior Elector Court, which is the government body responsible for organizing the elections. He and his backers would have few chances of success. 

In his favor, Bolsonaro has some support among the military. But given the price paid by the armed forces after the end of the military dictatorship which ruled the country between 1964 and 1985, it doesn’t seem very likely that many high-ranked officers would be willing to take that kind of risk. In fact, a coup itself is an easy thing to do, if you have the support of the military. The problem starts in the following weeks, months, and years, when economic reality kicks in and every regime must garner and maintain political support. There is no evidence that this would be an option for Brazilian officers today, let alone a coup to support a personal dictatorship of a president who has always been seen within military circles as an undisciplined ex-member of the military.

This leaves us with the much less likely, but still possible scenario of an electoral victory by Bolsonaro in the second round. In this case, we would probably see a continuation of the last four years. Conflict with judicial institutions could get worse, after Bolsonaro appoints two more judges to the Supreme Court. He could also attempt to pack the court, what would, however, be hard to pass through the senate. 

In the end, any reasonable observer of this year's Brazilian elections must agree that regardless of the election outcome, the process of institutional degradation is not limited to Bolsonaro's first term. His supporters will continue to challenge the most basic rules of constitutional democracy, and the damage already done requires major efforts to be repaired. Brazil will still live for a few years with the dire consequences of the 2018 elections.

Pablo Holmes is Associate Professor of Political Science and Constitutional Theory at the University of Brasília