Social Networks and Elections in Times of Disinformation by David Nemer - 03/18/22
While in the United States, people connect through Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, in many other countries, particularly those in the Global South, people unite through messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram. WhatsApp has been popular in Brazil since it entered the market in 2009. In 2018, there were around 120 million active WhatsApp users, out of a total population of 210 million. About 96 percent of Brazilians with access to a smartphone use WhatsApp as one of their main methods of communication. Brazilians use the messaging service as a hub for all social networking activity: keeping up with friends, sharing pictures, debating politics, sharing news, and conducting business in the informal economy, which employs thirty-eight million people.
During Brazil’s 2018 general elections, WhatsApp became a hotbed for political campaigns based on disinformation not only because of its affordances and widespread reach in the country but also because of its end-to-end encryption, which ensured that no one besides the sender and the receiver could read the content of messages. Social media platforms, such as Facebook, are often criticized for promoting disinformation and hateful content. Often, this is because the platforms algorithmically amplify such distasteful content. But messaging apps don’t rely on recommendation engines or endless scrolling features to keep people on the app. Instead, human infrastructure creates, promotes, and maintains these rage machines.
Thus, if Facebook bolstered the Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s election to the White House, the rise of Brazil’s far-right firebrand Jair Bolsonaro owes more to the messaging app WhatsApp. The difference, however, was that the Brexit and Trump campaigns relied on algorithms to create echo chambers, whereas Bolsonaro’s did not. Instead, his campaign assembled a human infrastructure to create a pro-Bolsonaro environment on WhatsApp and spread mis- and disinformation to bolster his candidacy.
Given the impact that misinformation had on WhatsApp users during these elections, which resulted in electing far-right candidates, Meta (the app’s owner) received a series of heavy criticism from scholars for not doing enough to mitigate the damage caused by disinformation campaigns. Ever since, the company has been implementing new features to slow down the spread of misinformation, such as limiting message forwarding and labeling messages that are being forwarded. While these measures are far from being an ideal solution, they have certainly made it more difficult for Brazilian strategists and campaigners to spread their fake news. Thus, in the search of a "WhatsApp alternative" for future elections, they have found in Telegram Messenger a safe haven for their disinformation campaigns.
Telegram is quickly expanding its presence in Brazil. In the most recent Panorama Mobile Time/Opinion Box survey, the app was present on 60% of cell phones in the country. Well-known political or media figures on the political far right have created groups and channels on the app and attracted hundreds of thousands of followers - the channel of president Jair Bolsonaro, for example, has over 1 million users. Despite Telegram’s popularity and importance in the country, the app remains a largely unmoderated space, by technical means or otherwise, making it an ideal tool for disinformation campaigns. Misinformation is not the only problem on Telegram: users are able to search and join public channels that are specifically geared towards sharing racist, Nazi, and homophobic content. In this regard, it is important to note that hate speech is not protected by the Brazilian constitution and have been criminalized in the country.
There are also public channels where users buy and sell counterfeit goods, guns, and fake vaccination cards.
Given the disruptive role that major messaging apps and social media platforms can take during this year’s election, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), responsible for overseeing and controlling the electoral proceedings in the country, has attempted to engage in conversations with their companies in order to understand the efforts taken to reduce the spread of misinformation. However, Telegram has been the only company that has refused to respond to the requests for contact. A group of prosecutors from the Federal Public Ministry (MPF) of São Paulo, which is conducting an inquiry into disinformation and fake news on social media platforms and messaging apps, is considering requesting a temporary blocking of Telegram during the 2022 elections. The prosecutors understand that Telegram is not interested in collaborating with the Brazilian justice system, and that it may be necessary to take any action in order to mitigate the potential harm that the app may cause during the elections.
President Jair Bolsonaro has been vocally opposing the consideration of MPF and TSE to possibly suspend Telegram, calling any such move “absurd” and "cowardly.” This is not surprising since Bolsonaro has been benefitting from the spread of misinformation since his first presidential candidacy in 2018.
In the leadup to this year’s elections, Bolsonaro also continues to make unproven claims that Brazil’s voting machines are fraudulent and susceptible to hacking attacks even though he has won every election during the country’s electronic vote era. Reminiscent of Trump’s rhetoric in 2020, Bolsonaro has already said that he may not accept the results of the 2022 election, creating fertile ground for disinformation and extremist acts. All told, Bolsonaro is creating the conditions for a very unstable election environment. If he loses the election, the world should bear in mind the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol and be prepared to witness an even more intense version in Brazil.
David Nemer is Assistant Professor of Media Studies and Affiliated Faculty in Latin American Studies at the University of Virginia. He is also a Faculty Associate at Harvard University’s Berkman Klein Center and an Affiliated Scholar at Princeton University’s Brazil Lab. He is the author of Technology of the Oppressed (MIT Press, 2022) and Favela Digital: The Other Side of Technology (GSA, 2013).
Feature articles express the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors or WBO.
